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Abstract 
 
The main objective of this contribution is to test whether university patents share common 
determinants with university publications at regional level. We build some university production 
functions with 1,519 patents and 180,239 publications for the 17 Spanish autonomous regions 
(NUTS-2) in a time span of 14 years (1988-2001). We use some econometric models to 
estimate their determinants. Our results suggest that there is little scope for regional policy to 
compensate the production of patents vs. publications through different university or joint 
research institutional settings. On the contrary, while patents are more reactive to expenditure 
on R&D, publications are more responsive to the number of researchers, so the sustained 
promotion of both will make it compatible for regions their joint production. However, standing 
out in the generation of both outputs requires costly investment in various inputs. 
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1. Introduction 
The rise of university patents has been a common trend for most developed countries 
during the last thirty years
1
. Some theoretical approaches to the relation between 
university science and industrial innovation provide some grounds to support these 
views. For Clark (1998: p. 7), “entrepreneurial universities learn faster than non-
entrepreneurial counterparts that money from many sources enhances the opportunity to 
make significant moves without waiting for systemwide enactments that come slowly, 
with standardizing rules attached”. For supporters of the Triple Helix approach, 
enhanced efforts by universities to be commercially relevant are a natural outcome of 
the changing role that society requires from them, more aimed at providing direct 
contributions to economic development (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000). 
Other voices have been more critical. Feller (1990) foresaw an “erosion of the 
singular position of universities in US”, whose traditional independence of market 
incentives committed them to an efficient supply of scientific and technological 
knowledge. Moreover, he found “little reason to expect that a substantial reallocation of 
faculty effort will generate appreciable net revenues for other than a select number of 
universities”. The economics of science approach (Dasgupta and David, 1994) 
theoretically justified these views by pointing to the substitutive effects between R&D 
leading to patents, and other research which provides less tangible but wider benefits.  
These conflicting views make university patents a relevant topic for policy making. 
Our main interest is to focus the debates in a regional context. The region is a crucial 
unit of observation for its capacity to implement science and technology policies and 
embed an idiosyncratic culture (Cooke, 1992). Hence, an immediate question is: do we 
confirm the common empirical findings on university patents of studies at sub-regional 
level when we analyse the regional level, e.g. regarding their relation to R&D 
expenditure? 
Besides, the use of regions may provide useful insights into other issues. For instance, 
we may wonder whether it would make sense for regions to choose strategically among 
different university and joint research structures to increase the number of university 
patents. Overall, our target question is: do regions have any scope to influence the 
generation of university patents through their academic structure? 
Moreover, the Triple Helix approach defends that the differences between basic and 
applied research are eventually blurring in growing fields of science with spontaneous 
industrial application. Therefore, it is natural that most productive faculty generate their 
traditional output, publications, but also patents (Etzkowitz, 1998). This view takes 
distance from the concern that university patents are not a relevant contribution to 
innovation, since the efforts to conduct research leading to patents may distort the 
resources devoted to other more useful research (Pavitt, 1998). In particular, we wonder 
where there might be a trade-off between R&D or other inputs leading to patents and 
publications. A constructive balance of inputs leading to both outputs may be important 
for a well working regional innovation system. Summing up: do the same forces drive 
university patents and publications? 
                                                 
1
 We will use this term to refer to patents applied for by universities. On patents with university inventors 
applied for by other institutions, see Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch (1998), Meyer (2004), Calderini et 
al. (2004) and Azagra et al. (2006a). 
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The rest of this paper follows the traditional structure to find some answers. Section 2 
presents the literature review. Section 3 describes the methodology and the data used to 
expand our knowledge. Section 4 gives the results. Section 5 reaches some conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. University patents and research productivity 
2.1.1. What is their relation at sub-regional level? 
Several studies apply econometric techniques to estimate the relation between 
university patents and different explanatory variables. The first six (Foltz et al., 2000; 
2001; Carlsson and Fridh, 2002; Payne and Siow, 2003; Coupé, 2003; Baldini et al., 
2004) use universities as a unit of observation, five in the US case and one in the Italian 
case. Two of them refer to the department or laboratory level of single European 
universities (Azagra et al., 2003, 2006a). A final study uses individuals as the unit of 
observation, from two MIT departments (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002)
2
.  
The most frequent determinant included is R&D expenditure. Carlsson and Fridh 
(2002) find a significant positive impact of aggregate R&D on the number of 
disclosures. Payne and Siow (2003) and Coupé (2003) conclude that the returns of 
federally funded R&D to patents are decreasing. Foltz et al. (2000) find the sum of 
federal and state funding positive and significant for all university patents but not 
significant for agricultural biotechnology university patents. Foltz et al. (2001) find that 
state funding has a positive, significant, influence on agricultural biotechnology 
university patents while federal funding has not. Azagra et al. (2003) find more costly, 
long-term-oriented, public funds significant, but not less costly, short-term-oriented 
ones. Azagra et al. (2006a) find regional public funds significant. Hence, it seems 
reasonable to propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The higher the amount of university R&D funds, the more likely it is that 
universities will generate patents. 
A second usual determinant of university patents is size. Foltz et al. (2001) and Payne 
and Siow (2003) do not find the number of faculty significant but Coupé (2003) does. 
Azagra et al. (2003) do not find it significant but Azagra et al. (2005) do. Baldini et al. 
(2004) do not always find significant the effect of budget transfer from central 
government, taken as a proxy for size rather than for R&D resources. Overall, the 
evidence is not conclusive. We will state the following hypothesis with the expectation 
of a positive sign: 
 
                                                 
2
 We should also mention other studies where the dependent variable is not patents but something related. 
Thursby and Kemp (2002) explain whether universities are efficient or not for commercial activities, 
patenting included. Siegel et al. (2003) analyse productivity of TTO, measured through the number of 
licenses and their revenue. Bercovitz and Feldman (2003) study the determinants of having filed a 
disclosure between 1997 and 1999.  
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Hypothesis 2. The higher the number of university researchers, the more likely it is that 
universities will generate patents. 
Other determinants are external forces that grow as time goes by.
3
 A trend variable 
may capture them. Coupé (2003), Azagra et al. (2003) and Baldini et al. (2004) find this 
trend positive and significant but Azagra et al. (2006a) do not. The explanation may be 
in the national features of the following forces: 
 Strength of technology transfer offices (TTO): Foltz et al. (2000) find that the 
number of employees of the TTO matters positively and significantly. In turn, Foltz 
et al. (2001) find that this measure is not significant, while a measure of the quality 
of the TTO is positive and significant. Coupé (2003) includes a dummy variable 
indicating the year of establishment of the TTO at the university, finding a positive 
and significant influence. The same happens to Carlsson and Fridh (2002) with the 
number of disclosures, on which the number of patent applications depends. They 
also find the influence of the number of TTO employees significant and positive. 
Azagra et al. (2003) find this too. 
 University R&D spillovers: Coupé (2003) includes a measure of aggregate R&D of 
other universities and he finds its impact positive and significant. Azagra et al. 
(2003) reach the same result. 
 Legal framework: Coupé (2003) uses a dummy variable to measure the legal change 
represented by the Bayh-Dole Act, without a significant effect. Something similar 
occurs to Azagra et al. (2003) with a dummy for an internal legal change that took 
place in their case study. However, Baldini et al. (2004) find that the adoption of an 
internal regulation is significant. 
Consequently, this is the hypothesis we want to test: 
Hypothesis 3. Over time, external forces (e.g. strength of TTO, university R&D 
spillovers, legal framework) make the number of university patents increase. 
2.1.2. Do regions have any scope to influence the generation of university patents through their 
academic structure? 
One may distinguish among types of universities according to the historical period of 
their creation, since each period may foster different missions and organisational 
structures, e.g. medieval, contemporary and post-World War II universities (Geuna, 
1999). One may think of different technical orientations (polytechnics and other) or 
regimes of ownership (public or private), etc. 
These differences may be relevant for the production of university patents. Coupé 
(2003) makes a distinction between public and private universities but he does not find 
significant differences. Foltz et al. (2000) find that the presence of agricultural schools 
and the importance of agriculture in the local economy help to explain the production of 
agricultural biotechnology university patents. Baldini et al. (2004) do not find evidence 
that the presence of a medical school affects patenting. In addition, Mowery and Sampat 
(2001) show that, according to the prevailing incentives at a particular time, public or 
private universities will change their interest in patenting. In any case, regions may 
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 This is not to say that there are no more internal determinants of university patenting. Foltz et al (2001) 
and Coupé (2003) include a measure of faculty quality (average wage). Foltz et al. (2001) and Baldini et 
al. (2004) include a measure of patenting experience. 
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contain different numbers and types of universities, because of their own historical 
trajectory and decision-making. This motivates the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. University structure matters: the composition of universities according to 
their age, technical orientation or regime of ownership will influence the generation of 
patents. 
The existence of joint research centres between universities and public research 
organisations (e.g. CNRS in France, CNR in Italy, CSIC in Spain) implies access to 
larger capital and human infrastructure in order to obtain newer and more important 
discoveries. Hence, for universities, having joint research centres with public 
organisations may increase their resources. Besides, these organisations may have 
cultural and functional features that lead to higher protection by means of patents, e.g. 
their preference for research leading to practical applications as compared to 
universities (Cesaroni and Piccalugga, 2002) or the lack of teaching responsibilities. 
Azagra et al. (2003) show that the presence of a joint research centre at a university 
increases its propensity to patent. For these reasons, we present the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5. Joint research structure matters: the higher the number of joint research 
centres between universities and other public research organisations, the more likely it 
will be that universities generate patents. 
2.2. University patents and university publications: do the same inputs produce both 
outputs? 
The literature has long studied the idea that certain personal characteristics matter in 
the process of scientific production, e.g. age or gender (Stephan, 1996; Xie and 
Shauman, 1998). The analysis at institutional level is most recent but it is enough to 
show some evidence that there exists a relation between university R&D and university 
publications (Adams and Griliches, 2000; Crespi and Geuna, 2005). At laboratory level, 
the negative effects of age structure and size and the inconclusive effect of spatial 
agglomeration have also been tested (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2003, 2005). 
The explained variable has always been the count of publications, sometimes 
weighted by the number of citations. The analysis of university patents have been the 
focus of studies like those in section 2.1.1. However, both traditions think in terms of 
common determinants, e.g. R&D or size. Payne and Siow (2003) actually explain 
university publications and patents as a function of these. They find that each additional 
one million dollars in federal funding produces 11 articles and 0.2 patents. Size, 
measured through number of faculty, does not have a significant impact on any outputs. 
Another econometric approach to the relation between university publications and 
patents has been to estimate the former as a function of the latter, and/or vice versa, at 
individual or laboratory level. Thus, Agrawal and Henderson (2002) show that the 
number of papers (patents) does not depend on the number of current and lagged patents 
(papers)
4
. In turn, Carayol and Matt (2004) regress average publication performance on 
number of patent applications and find a positive relation. In any case, this approach are 
arguable, it shows no negative association between university publications and patents. 
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 However, they find some complementarities between patenting impact and publishing impact. 
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Breschi et al. (2005) overcome arguable  assumptions on the direction of causality by 
using a hazard function, and they find a positive relation.
5
 
No attempts have been made to study this issue at regional level. On the former basis, 
we start by formulating an intuitive hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6. The determinants of university patents and university publications are 
coincident. 
3. Methodology and data 
The aim of the present section is to estimate some econometric models on the 
determinants of university patents and publications and test the hypotheses raised.  
The sample contains data about Spain, a member country of the European Union 
(EU). According to OECD (2002), Gross Expenditure on Research and Development 
(GERD) as a percentage of GDP grew from 0.41 in 1981 to 0.97 in 2001, the first year 
to reach 50% of the EU average. GERD performed by the Business Enterprise sector 
rose from 45.5% to 54.3% in the same period, around 0.2 times lower than the EU 
average in the last decade. In turn, GERD performed by the Higher Education sector 
rose from 22.9% to 29.4% and was around 0.4 times higher than the EU average. 
However, Higher Education Expenditure on Research and Development (HERD) as a 
percentage of GDP, which augmented from 0.09 to 0.28, has only reached 70% of the 
EU average in 2000. Hence, Spanish universities perform more R&D activities than 
Spanish firms do in relative terms, but still little compared to EU universities. This is 
representative of peripheral countries of the EU as well as of economically developed 
countries with some technological weaknesses. Nevertheless, HERD financed by 
industry has increased from 1.2% in 1984 to 6.9% in 2000, fluctuating widely above the 
EU average from 1988, maybe due to statistical reasons (17% more in 2000). In any 
case, it seems that Spanish universities follow the general trend of increased industrial 
funding, common to most Western economies. 
We collected data for 14 years and the 17 Spanish autonomous regions. The resulting 
database is therefore a 238-observation panel.
6
 
3.1. Dependent variables and methods of estimation 
A first set of data comprise Spanish university patents in the period 1988-2001. We 
include applications and grants, because both sorts of documents integrate the state of 
the art and can be a reference for future patents. Data come from the CIBEPAT database 
of the Spanish Patent and Trademark Office (OEPM).  
Our period of observation begins from 1988 because data for some independent 
variables start in 1987 and we assume, at least, a one year lag with them (see next sub-
section). It is a good starting date in that the European Patent Agreement came into 
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 Biliometrics also suggest a positive association between publishing and patenting, at least in a science-
based technology (Meyer, 2005). 
6
 There have been some studies on university patents in Spain, not published in English. They tend to 
assume that university patents are positive and the main question is how to enhance their generation. 
(Fernández de Córdoba, 1996; Durán, 2003; Coronado et al., 2003).  
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force in Spain in 1986 and the PCT in 1989. The last year of the sample is 2001 because 
of the delay of updating. 
We made a query to identify all patents with at least one Spanish university among 
the applicants. As we may see in Table 1, we found 1,479 “real” patents. We assigned 
patents to regions according to the main site of the university. When more than one 
university appeared in the list of applicants, we chose to assign one patent per 
university. This way, we generated 1,519 “counted” patents. Therefore, this method 
does not produce a high distortion in the data, only 2.7%. Another reading of this is that 
there is little collaboration between Spanish universities to get protection for 
technological discoveries. 
Table 1 also shows that most patent documents are national patents (94.5% of real 
and counted patents) while international patents represent a low percentage (5.5% of 
real and counted patents) of all the patents maybe because of their higher costs and 
requirements. 
In addition, while most national patents are grants (81.6%), most international patents 
are applications (75.9%) due to the delay of the granting process. 
Table 1. Distribution of real and counted patents by route of patenting 
 
Real patents Counted patents 
Total Applied patents Granted Patents Total 
National patents 1398 264 1172 1436 
International patents 81 63 20 83 
European patents 10 7 3 10 
PCT patents 71 56 17 73 
TOTAL 1479 327 1192 1519 
Source: OEPM: Cibepat and own elaboration. 
Considering all this, we defined the next variables for the estimations: 
 Natpat: number of Spanish university counted patents applied for through the 
national route. 
 Natgrant: number of Spanish university counted patents granted through the 
national route. 
 Intpat: number of Spanish university counted patents applied for through an 
international route, i.e. the sum of both European and PCT patents. We considered it 
appropriate to add together these two sets of patents because of the small number of 
patents in each one. 
Our framework of analysis is the knowledge production function introduced by 
Griliches (1979). In order to find the adequate estimation technique, we must take into 
account that patents are typical count data. The baseline model is the Poisson regression 
model (PRM), which holds under the assumption of equidispersion. An extension of the 
PRM is the Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM), which relaxes this 
assumption. However, one might argue that different reasons cause the presence of 
zeros. Zero-inflated count models respond to this failure. 
Because of the small number of international patents, we followed an alternative 
approach by creating the following variable: 
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 Intpat2: having at least one university counted patent, applied for through an 
international route. It is a transformation of intpat, leaving data with zeros as they 
were originally and transforming all the rest into ones. 
Following this alternative approach, a more appropriate technique of estimation for 
intpat2 is the Probit Model.  
A second set of data comprise Spanish university publications, namely, those 
included in the Web of Science databases of Thomson Scientific-ISI during the period 
1988-2001. Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Science Citation Index and Social 
Sciences Citation index are multidisciplinary databases that cover mainstream 
international scientific journals. 
In order to search for the Spanish university publications, all records including a 
Spanish university in the address field were retrieved. Moreover, the query included the 
variants corresponding to each Spanish university’s name to ensure the exhaustiveness 
in the retrieving process. 
Whole counting scheme is used, that is to say, each “real” publication out of 159,015 
has been assigned in full to all unique institution appearing in the address field (Okubo, 
1997). A consequence of this counting method is the larger number of “counted” 
publications, 180,239 in total, due to the collaboration between Spanish universities. 
The rate of duplication is therefore 13.3%, higher than in the case of patents, which 
means that scientific collaboration is a more frequent practice than technological 
cooperation among universities. 
All types of documents were taken into account (articles, reviews, editorials, letters, 
etc.). Finally, we use this variable: 
 Lpub: logarithm of the number of Spanish university counted international 
publications in the AHCI, SCI and SSCI databases.  
We employed models for panel data to do the estimations.  
3.2. Independent variables and selection technique 
All the independent variables in the regression model are lagged one year in order to 
prevent endogeneity as much as possible. A first set of data comes from the National 
Statistics Institute (INE), specifically from R&D activities statistics. Regionalisation of 
these data started in 1987, which explains the beginning of our period of observation: 
 Lherd: logarithm of the real value of university R&D expenditure (in thousand 
Euro), using the GDP deflator. 
 Lfte: logarithm of the number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) researchers. 
We also introduce the following variable: 
 Trend: year of the patent application. 
Aspects concerning university structure come from the Universia.es portal
7
: 
 Univst1: a vector of three variables classifying universities according to their regime 
of ownership and being a polytechnic. Ppub is the proportion of public, non-
polytechnic universities, ppol the proportion of public, polytechnic universities and 
ppriv the proportion of private universities. We use ppub as the benchmark. 
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 http://www.universia.es. 
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 Univst2: a vector of four variables classifying universities according to epoch of 
creation, following Geuna (1999) and Rodríguez-San Pedro (2004): pmed is the 
proportion of medieval universities (up to 1475), pmod of modern universities (up to 
1800), pcont of contemporary universities (up to 1943) and prec of recent 
universities. Pmed is the benchmark. 
Since univst1 and univst2 overlap, we use them alternatively for the estimations. 
From the Spanish High Council for Scientific Research’s (CSIC) reports, we build 
the variables regarding other public research infrastructure: 
 Pjoi: ratio of number of university-CSIC joint research centres to number of 
universities. 
Although not to test any hypothesis, it is important to control for regional capacity 
and thus we built the following variable from INE: 
 Lpop: logarithm of population size. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the independent variables. The average R&D 
expenditure was 34.3 million euros per region and year while the average number of 
FTE-researchers was 1385. There were around three universities per region and year: 
more than 84% were public, around 12% were private and less than 4% were 
polytechnics. According to their time of creation, there were 3% medieval, 19% 
modern, 15% contemporary and 63% recent universities. For joint research centres there 
were more than one per region and year while their proportion was approximately 37%, 
i.e. more than one third of universities had one joint research centre on average. Finally, 
the average region had a population of 2.3 million people. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of independent variables8. N=238. 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Herd 34341.6 39254 1.57601 4.45536 0 157684 
Fte 1385.13 1615.24 1.75914 5.48994 0 7802 
Ppub 0.845971 0.214805 -0.959798 2.39631 0.333333 1 
Ppol 0.0346885 0.0812606 2.41663 7.87373 0 0.333333 
Ppriv 0.119341 0.19732 1.31779 3.14932 0 0.666667 
Pmed 0.033691 0.106962 3.39215 13.6024 0 0.5 
Pmod 0.185578 0.333386 1.78634 4.67427 0 1 
Pcont 0.153797 0.255156 1.7164 5.37017 0 1 
Prec 0.626934 0.346687 -0.658058 2.24702 0 1 
Pjoi 0.367389 0.547863 1.95464 7.62337 0 3 
Pop 2329184.71 2005968.62 1.16923 3.1667 260964 7340052 
 
When we run the regressions, we follow this selection strategy: we start by choosing 
between Poisson, negative binomial and zero inflated models. Once the best technique 
has been selected, we delete the non-significant variable the coefficient of which has the 
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 Note that for the estimations we took non-proportion variables (herd, fte, pop) in logs (lherd, lfte, lpop). 
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worst t-value
9
. We estimate a reduced model without the deleted variable. We make a 
likelihood ratio test against the original model. If the test shows preference for the 
reduced model, we repeat the previous steps. If there are no non-significant variables to 
delete, we accept the reduced model
10
. 
4. Results 
We show the final reduced models in Table 3. For count data models negative 
binomial estimations were always preferred to Poisson and zero inflated negative 
binomial ones. For the OLS estimation, a fixed effects model with regional dummies 
was preferred to a random effects model and to the inclusion of time dummies. 
Table 3. Estimation of Spanish university patent and publication production functions 
 
1 
Negative 
Binomial 
Regression 
2 
Negative 
Binomial 
Regression 
3 
Negative 
Binomial 
Regression 
4 
Binomial 
Probit Model 
5 
Least Squares 
with Group 
Dummy 
Variables       
Dependent 
variable  
Natpat Natgrant Intpat Intpat2 Lpub 
Number of 
observations 
238 238 238 238 238 
Log likelihood 
function  
-509.28 -508.17 -133.18 -79.99 222.00 
Prob[χ
2
>value] =  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R
2
 0.84 0.76 0.52 0.84 0.97 
      
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Constant -179.25 (-6.07) -9.24 (-13.75) -5.89 (-1.38) -1.35 (-0.51)  
Lherd 2.33 (17.02) 2.38 (16) 6.01 (4.52) 3.66 (4.52)  
Lfte     0.16 (8) 
Trend 0.09 (5.75)    0.04 (16.72) 
Ppol 1.11 (1.79)  0.02 (0.01) 1.1 (0.78) -0.15 (-0.95) 
Ppriv -0.57 (-2.1)  -2.39 (-2.31) -1.76 (-2.5) -0.25 (-2.52) 
Lpop   -3.51 (-2.44) -2.49 (-2.82)  
 0.27 (4.66) 0.58 (5.96) 1.32 (2.65)   
T-ratios in parenthesis. R
2
 is the Poisson-associated model R
2
 for the Negative Binomial Regression and 
the count R
2
 for the Binomial Probit Model 
We start with Columns 1 to 4, referred to patents. There is empirical evidence that 
Hypothesis 1 is valid, since the variable of R&D expenditure indicates a significant 
positive relation with the number of university patents in all estimations. From columns 
1 to 3, we see that a one percent increase in R&D funds will increase the number of 
patents issued by universities more than 2% and the number of international patents by 
6%. Via a Wald test, at 5% significance level we reject the hypothesis that the estimated 
coefficients of R&D for national and international patents are equal.  
Moreover, this is a higher ratio than in previous results by Payne and Siow (2003) 
and Coupé (2003), where the increase of patents was not higher than 1%. The 
explanation may lie in the fact that they use only public funding rather than all funding. 
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 In the case of groups of dummies (univst1, univst2), we test their joint significance. 
10
 In a similar fashion we carried out the selection procedure for the probit and panel data models. 
Azagra et al. / After 5
th
 Triple Helix Conference 10 
However, Azagra et al. (2003, 2006a) also use all funding but find lower elasticity for 
R&D funds. A second explanation may be, then, the unit of observation. Adams and 
Griliches (2000) find that research output follows diminishing returns to scale at the 
individual level but constant returns at the aggregate level. We treat our sample data at 
an even higher level of aggregation. 
The data do not confirm Hypothesis 2, so the number of university researchers does 
not seem to influence the number of patents issued in Spain. 
The data give evidence to support Hypothesis 3 only in the case of natpat. We find 
the time trend significant, as in Azagra et al. (2003, 2006a) and Coupé (2003), meaning 
that there are exogenous factors not included in the present model, which produce only 
more national applications, i.e. probably lower quality patents. Henderson et al. (1998) 
and Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) find somewhat similar results in the US case, 
regarding the declining quality of university patents. 
The data partially support Hypothesis 4, i.e. university structure influences the 
production of national university patents. Age structure (univst2) is never jointly 
significant. Other characteristics (univst1) are sometimes significant. A higher 
proportion of polytechnic universities will involve a (weak) increase of national 
applications, but not of any other kind of patents. A higher proportion of private 
universities will lead the region to apply less often for every kind of patents. 
The data do not support Hypothesis 5 – joint research structure does not influence the 
production of university patents.
11
 
If we now look into Column 5, referred to university publications, we can see that 
there is conflicting evidence to support Hypothesis 6. We would reject it because R&D 
should have a significant effect on publications as on patents, but it does not, and 
because the opposite occurs with the number of researchers. We would accept the 
hypothesis because university structure and the trend are influential, pointing in the 
same direction as the effect on patents: over time, the number of publications increases, 
whereas a higher proportion of private universities will make it decrease. Moreover, the 
proportion of joint research centers has no significant effect, as on patents. In any case, 
what comes out of the analysis is that there are no inputs with significant effects and 
different signs on publications and patents, so it is compatible for regions to produce 
both. 
5. Conclusions 
Three main interests guided this research: Do we confirm the relation between 
university patents and research productivity at regional level? If so, do regions have any 
scope to influence the generation of university patents through their academic structure? 
In addition, do the same forces drive university patents and publications? 
According to our results, university patents are an expression of R&D efforts also 
when we focus on the region, and patent applications are an indicator of how regions 
organize their university structure. Therefore, if there is a re-composition of academic 
R&D favouring patentable results, regions can control their university structure to 
                                                 
11
 We tried to discount joint centres in social sciences and humanities from our measure. It did not change 
the results. 
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compensate for it, e.g. hindering the proportion of polytechnic universities and 
favouring the proportion of private universities
12
. 
However, the former will have no effect on university publications while the latter 
will also decrease the probability of generating these publications. Besides, no option 
guarantees some bearing on national patent grants. Consequently, the scope of changes 
in university structure is very limited. In Spain, the reason may be that regional 
governments have created recent universities in order to attend for increases in 
population and students after economic buoyancy, rather than as a deliberate attempt to 
improve local scientific and technological production. 
In the same sense, we are concerned with the non-confirmation that a stronger 
presence of joint research centres may increase the probability of generating patents and 
publications at universities. If our results are certain, a possible explanation may lie in a 
too high proportion of university professors in their staff and a too low share of CSIC 
researchers, with the consequent heavy teaching load. We recall that joint research 
centres may be still useful to produce other benefits at regional level, e.g. scientific 
networks, contracts, spin-off firms, etc.  
More possibilities arise if we think that while university patents are more reactive to 
expenditure on R&D at regional level, university publications are more responsive to 
the number of researchers, i.e. financial capital is more important for the former, human 
capital for the latter. It means that sustained promotion of both will make it compatible 
for regions their joint production. 
It also implies that standing out in the generation of both outputs requires costly 
investment in many inputs. The sacrifice is relevant for an efficient working of a 
regional innovation system, since universities may be able to interact with several types 
of local firms –those interested in direct technological potentialities, mainly embedded 
in patents, and those able to absorb broader scientific knowledge with riskier but more 
creative application, mainly related to publications. 
We must mention some limitations in our econometric models. We prevented 
endogeneity to some extent by lagging all the independent variables one period, but the 
problem may still exist if older patents are an input for some of them. We could reduce 
it by trying with longer lags, but then we would lose some observations. In addition, we 
did not test for spatial autocorrelation. However, the negative binomial and zero inflated 
models that we use take into account heterogeneity among regions, so this and the 
inclusion of population size as a determinant should reduce the problem. 
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